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Fairness and Fair Shares
KEITH HORTON

University of Wollongong

Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task,
if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s fair share being what she would be
required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis
for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already
done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won’t do their fair share. The
philosopher who has written most about this issue, however, Liam Murphy, argues that
it is not unfair to do so, at least in the standard sense of that term. In this article, I give
Murphy’s reasons for saying this, explain why I think he’s wrong, and then say a little
about why this issue might be important.

Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share
of a common task, if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s
fair share being what she would be required to do if all contributed as
they should. (Act-) consequentialist principles of beneficence provide
one important example. Such principles require agents to promote the
good as much as they can, roughly speaking. If some agents do not act
on such a principle, then my acting on it will involve doing more than
my fair share of good-promoting – my fair share being how much goodpromoting I would have to do if everyone promoted the good as much
as they could. And this seems to provide a strong basis for objecting
to such principles. For it seems unfair that I should be required to do
more than my fair share of good-promoting, just because others won’t
do their fair share.
This is an important part of moral theory, but surprisingly little
progress has been made with it. One symptom of this is that there is
not yet agreement even on what kind of objection it is. It seems natural
to say that it is unfair to require individuals in such circumstances to do
more than their fair share, as I have just done, and others have done.1
The philosopher who has written most about this issue, however, Liam
Murphy, argues that it is not unfair to do so, at least in the standard
sense of that term. In this article, I give Murphy’s reasons for saying
this, explain why I think he’s wrong, and then say a little about why
this might be important.

1
See e.g. Dan W. Brock, ‘Defending Moral Options’, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 51 (1991), pp. 909–13, at 912.
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Murphy focuses on a standard consequentialist principle, which he
calls the ‘optimizing principle of beneficence’. This principle requires
agents to promote the good as much as they can, roughly speaking.2 In
situations of partial compliance with this principle – situations in which
some agents do not act on this principle – my acting on it will involve
doing more than my fair share of good-promoting, if one takes my fair
share of good-promoting to be how much good-promoting I would have
to do if everyone promoted the good as much as they could.3 Is it unfair
to require me to do more than my fair share in this sense? Murphy
writes:
under partial compliance with the optimizing principle of beneficence, each
agent is required to fulfill what would be his own fairly allocated responsibility
under full compliance plus (speaking roughly) some of the responsibility that
properly belongs to noncomplying agents. Since each agent faces exactly the
same requirement – and in substance, not just in form – no standard issue of
fairness can arise . . .4

And he goes on (pp. 90–1):
the principle itself would be unfair, in the standard sense, only if, for example,
some but not all people were required to make sacrifices that would leave them
in a worse position than they would be under full compliance. The idea of
fairness, in its standard or central sense, is comparative or distributional; and
the optimizing principle of beneficence, since it treats all agents substantively
the same way under partial compliance, cannot be said to impose responsibility
under partial compliance in a way that is unfair in that central sense.5

One can see Murphy’s point. Certainly, one standard way in which
a principle can be unfair is by treating some agents differently from
others in a context in which fairness requires that they be treated
in the same way.6 And the optimizing principle of beneficence is not

2

See Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory (Oxford, 2000), p. 6.
One might of course question the claim that one’s fair share of good-promoting is how
much good-promoting one would have to do if everyone promoted the good as much as
they could. For the purposes of tackling the issue that is the focus of this article, though,
we need not do so. For those purposes, the question is whether, granting that claim, it
would be unfair to require agents to do more than that if some agents do not promote the
good as much as they can. (Murphy argues for the claim in question in Moral Demands,
ch. 6.)
4
Moral Demands, p. 90.
5
See also Liam Murphy, ‘The Demands of Beneficence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs
22 (1993), pp. 267–92, at 283–4. In both places, Murphy attributes this argument to
Derek Parfit. Garrett Cullity articulates the same argument in Garrett Cullity, The
Moral Demands of Affluence (Oxford, 2004), p. 241, n. 10, but does not attempt to assess
it.
6
For ease of exposition, I shall sometimes speak of principles as being unfair; this
should be taken as shorthand for the claim that such principles require something it is
unfair to require.
3
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unfair in that sense.7 Acknowledgement of this point hardly removes
the sense that it is unfair to require agents to do more than their fair
share, though. So what is going on?8
The first thing to note is that in order for a principle to be fair, it is
not sufficient for it to tell each relevant agent to do the same thing (in a
context in which it is appropriate to treat all agents in the same way).9
We also need to take into account what it tells each agent to do. This
might be easiest to see if we begin with another kind of case. Imagine
that a prisoner, Jake, agrees to do extra work for a month in return for
extra rations. He keeps his side of the bargain, but at the end of the
month the prison warden tells Jake that he has changed his mind, and
that Jake will now have to do extra work for another month in order
to get the extra rations. Jake objects that it is unfair for the warden to
change the terms of the agreement as he goes along in this way. The
warden replies, ‘But I treat every other prisoner in the same way. And
so whatever objection you might have to my behaviour, you can’t really
claim that I’m treating you unfairly – at least not in the standard sense
of that term.’
Would this reply satisfy Jake – or us? I take it as uncontroversial that
it would not. Changing the terms of an agreement in the kind of way the
warden does is a paradigm case of unfair behaviour. And this is because
it contravenes a material principle of fairness: that agreements are
to be honoured.10 Because it contravenes this principle, the warden’s
behaviour toward Jake is unfair. And because it is unfair for the warden
to treat Jake in this way, doing so remains unfair even if the warden
treats every prisoner (substantively) the same way. As Joel Feinberg
puts it in a related context, ‘If we treat everybody unfairly, but equally
and impartially so, we have done each an injustice that is, at best, only
mitigated by the equal injustice done all the others.’11 If Murphy were
7
Given the fact that some people are not doing their fair share, that principle requires
each agent to do more than their fair share, including those who have not even done their
fair share.
8
For Murphy’s explanation of what is going on, see Moral Demands, pp. 90–3. He
suggests that while principles that require agents to do more than their fair share are
not unfair in the standard sense, it is nevertheless ‘defensible’ to call them unfair because
the argument for objecting to such principles ‘connects at important points with the idea
of fairness’ (93). (In ‘The Demands’, by contrast, Murphy argues without qualification
that one cannot say that such principles are unfair.) I argue that one can say that such
principles are unfair without the need for any qualification or hedging, and in a perfectly
standard sense of the term.
9
In some cases fairness requires treating different agents differently, of course,
because of relevant differences in their circumstances. We need not consider such cases
here, though.
10
This is merely a summary statement of the relevant principle, of course, but for
current purposes it is not necessary to go into the complications and qualifications.
11
Joel Feinberg, ‘Noncomparative Justice’, The Philosophical Review 83 (1974),
pp. 297–338, at 300.
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right, the very idea of treating everyone unfairly would not make sense
(at least in the standard sense of the term).
Similar considerations apply to the optimizing principle, and to other
principles that require agents to do more than their fair share of some
common task, when some won’t do their fair share. (Call such principles
‘more-than-fair-share principles’.) Such principles also contravene a
material principle of fairness: that the burdens of contributing to a
common task are to be distributed equitably amongst all those who
should contribute to that task – all those who should contribute,
not only those who do contribute.12 Such a distribution assigns each
individual their fair share. Principles that require agents to do more
than that contravene this principle. And consequently, such principles
are unfair, even when they treat all agents (substantively) the same
way.13
In general, then, principles and practices that infringe material
principles of fairness are unfair, even if they do not infringe any formal
principles of fairness – even if, for example, they treat all relevantly
similar agents the same way. And they are unfair in a perfectly standard
sense of the term. This is evidenced at the intuitive level by the fact that
it is perfectly natural to call such principles and practices unfair. And
at the theoretical level, there is simply no good reason for saying that
principles and practices that infringe material principles of fairness
can only be unfair in a sense of the term that is non-standard.
We can, then, vindicate the intuition that it is unfair, in a perfectly
standard sense of that term, to require agents to do more than their
fair share when other agents won’t do their fair share. And we can also
state clearly why it is unfair to do so – because doing so contravenes the
standard and uncontroversial material principle of fairness outlined
above. This doesn’t answer all our questions about this objection to
such principles, of course, but it does at least enable us to put it in the
right normative category. And as I shall now show, it may also help us
to put the objection in its most plausible form.14
It is striking in this context that Murphy argues for an absolute
constraint against requiring agents to do more than their fair share
12
Again, this is merely a summary statement of the relevant principle, but for current
purposes it is not necessary to go into the complications and qualifications.
13
The sense in which more-than-fair-share principles are unfair is also a distributional
one, in at least one good sense of that term. For the problem with such principles is
that they distribute responsibilities in an unfair way – the fair way being assigning each
agent their fair share.
14
Murphy himself says that he does not think much turns on the issue of whether or
not one can say that the optimizing principle is unfair because of the fact that it requires
agents to do more than their fair share of beneficence (Moral Demands, p. 193). What I
go on to say in the main text provides one reason to think that this issue may in fact be
very important.
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of beneficence.15 This position is highly counter-intuitive, because of
cases in which the cost of doing more than one’s fair share is trivial,
and the benefits to others are great. (Call such cases ‘low-cost highbenefit cases’.) In one standard example, two passers-by (Jane and
John) come upon two children drowning. Saving each would involve
paying some small cost. Jane and John are both morally required to
save one child, on the assumption that the other will also save one.
If John refuses to do so, though, what is Jane morally required to do?
If there is an absolute constraint against requiring agents to do more
than their fair share of beneficence, and saving the second child would
mean that Jane does more than her fair share, then we would have
to say that she is not required to save the second child. And this is
indeed what Murphy says.16 This is highly counter-intuitive, though.
Indeed, it is so counter-intuitive that such cases apparently lead many
to assume that the objection to more-than-fair-share principles that we
have been discussing (call it the ‘Fair Shares Objection’) has no role at
all in determining our obligations of beneficence.
Thinking of the objection in the kind of way I have suggested, as
being based in a standard way on considerations of fairness, suggests
a different picture, and one that enables us to give the intuitively
right answer in low-cost high-benefit cases without implying that that
objection has no relevance at all to our obligations of beneficence. Two
related features of such considerations are particularly relevant here:
first, that objections to principles based on considerations of fairness
can be more or less strong, depending on various factors including
how great the consequences of such unfairness are; and second, that
(in part for this reason) considerations of fairness are naturally and
standardly taken to be decisive in some contexts and not in others,
depending on how strong the objection based on such considerations
is in the context in question, and on what other considerations are in
play. Given these features, it would be very odd to argue for an absolute
constraint against principles requiring agents to do more than their
fair share, if one thinks of the objection to such principles as being
based on considerations of fairness. For to do so would be to take such
considerations to have an invariant and overriding force, no matter
how weak or strong those considerations are in the particular context
in question, and how weak or strong any countervailing considerations
are. It would be much more natural to take that objection to be scalar
in its force – weaker or stronger in different contexts – and in part
for that reason as being decisive on some occasions and not on others,

15
16

He calls this constraint the ‘compliance condition’ (Moral Demands, p. 77).
Moral Demands, pp. 127–33.
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depending inter alia on how strong the objection is in the context in
question, and what other considerations are in play.
Such an interpretation, I suggest, is far superior to the constraint
model. On the one side, it enables us to give the intuitively right answer
in the kind of case sketched above. For in that case, the cost to Jane
of rescuing the second child is small, and therefore it is natural to
interpret the objection to her doing so (on the picture just sketched) as
being very weak. And if the objection to her doing so is very weak, then
it is presumably easily overridden by the fact that a life is at stake. At
the same time, though, this needn’t commit us to the view that the Fair
Shares Objection lacks any role at all in determining our obligations
of beneficence. For that objection will be stronger when (what one
might call) the more-than-fair-share costs (the costs beyond those that
a principle requiring one to do one’s fair share would impose) are higher.
And for this reason, that objection may yet be decisive when the costs
are high enough, even if the benefits to others are still great.17 On this
alternative model, then, we can give the intuitively right answer in
low-cost high-benefit cases without ruling out the possibility that the
Fair Shares Objection is decisive in other cases. And that, I suggest,
makes the objection harder to dismiss.
I will not pursue these issues further here.18 For now, my point is just
that this alternative and (I suggest) superior understanding of the Fair
Shares Objection is the natural one if one thinks of that objection as
being based straightforwardly on (standard) considerations of fairness.
And for this reason, it may in fact make a big difference whether or not
one thinks of it in this way.
khorton@uow.edu.au

17

That objection may of course also be decisive when the benefits to others are lower.
I say a little more about them in Keith Horton, ‘International Aid: The Fair Shares
Factor’, Social Theory and Practice 30 (2004), pp. 161–74.
18

